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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44402
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-10218
v. )
)
GREGORY ALLYN HUBBARD, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
___________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After  a jury trial,  Mr.  Hubbard was found guilty  of  one count of  battery on a law
enforcement officer.  The district court imposed a sentence of three years, with six
months fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Hubbard asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed the sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In July of 2015, Boise Police Officer Griffin responded to assist the fire
department after someone called 911 to report that an attic was on fire.  (Presentence
2Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.)1  Officer Griffin said Mr. Hubbard was acting
unpredictably when arrived on scene.  (PSI, p.4.)  Officer Griffin also thought
Mr. Hubbard was paranoid as he was describing “voids in the floor” and things in the
attic.  (PSI, p.4.)  During the conversation, Officer Griffin told Mr. Hubbard to take his
hands out of his pockets, but he continued to put his hands back in his pockets.  (PSI,
p.4.)  Mr. Hubbard also refused to sit down.  (PSI, p.4.)  When Officer Griffin attempted
to place Mr. Hubbard under arrest, he told him to place his hands behind his back.
(PSI, p.5.)  Mr. Hubbard refused to do so, and a struggle ensued during which
Mr. Hubbard allegedly kicked Officer Griffin in the leg.  (PSI, p.5.)  A backup officer then
deployed a taser, and Mr. Hubbard was taken into custody.  (PSI, p.5.)
 Subsequently, Mr. Hubbard was charged with one count of battery on a law
enforcement officer and one misdemeanor count of resisting or obstructing officers.
(R., pp.32-33.)  Mr. Hubbard proceeded to trial.  After the trial, the jury was hung on the
battery charge but found Mr. Hubbard guilty of the misdemeanor charge.  (Tr., p.389,
L.21 – p.393, L.7; R., p.106.)    As such, the district court declared a mistrial as to that
charge.  (Tr., p.393, Ls.13-14.)  The State later opted to retry the case, and Mr. Hubbard
was found guilty of the battery charge after a second trial.  (Tr., p.858, Ls.2-10.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose
a five year sentence, with two years fixed.  (Tr., p.862, Ls.6-20.)  Mr. Hubbard’s counsel
requested that the district court impose a sentence of five years, with zero years fixed,
so that Mr. Hubbard could immediately pursue drug and alcohol treatment.  (Tr., p.864,
Ls.2-9.)  The district court then imposed a sentence of three years, with six months
1 All citations to the PSI refer to the 443-page electronic document.
3fixed, on the battery charge,2 and a concurrent sentence of 180 days in the Ada County
Jail on the misdemeanor charge.  (Tr., p.869, Ls.16-18; R., p.190.)  Mr. Hubbard filed a
notice of appeal that was timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.195-97.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of three years,
with six months fixed, following Mr. Hubbard’s conviction for battery on a law
enforcement officer?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Three Years,
With Six Months Fixed, Following Mr. Hubbard’s Conviction For Battery On A Law
Enforcement Officer
Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Hubbard’s sentence of six months fixed, with
two and one-half years indeterminate is excessive because it is not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing.  When there is a claim that the sentencing court
imposed an excessive sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
examination of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000).  In such a
review, an appellate court considers “whether the court acted within the boundaries of
2 The district court ordered that this sentence run consecutively to Mr. Hubbard’s
sentence in CR-FE-2011-3345.  (R., p.190.)
4such discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices,
and whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.” State v.
Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1988).  When a sentence is unreasonable based on
the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90
(1982).  Unless it appears that confinement was necessary “to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case,” a sentence is
unreasonable. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  Accordingly, if the
sentence is excessive, “under any reasonable view of the facts,” because it is not
necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of
discretion. Id.
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Hubbard’s sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  First, Mr. Hubbard admitted that he
was struggling with a serious substance abuse problem and was under the influence of
bath salts at the time he committed this offense.  (PSI, p.7; Tr., p.865, L.18 – p.866,
L.5.)  Mr. Hubbard said he was experiencing drug-induced schizophrenia and
hallucinating when he spoke with Officer Griffin.  (PSI, p.7.)  He said that he had never
had to question his own thought processes before this incident, and he was terrified in
the weeks leading up to this event.  (Tr., p.865, L.23 – p.866, L.2.)  A defendant’s
substance abuse problem and how that abuse may have played a part in the crime
should be considered as mitigating information. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)
(reducing defendant’s sentence, in part, because “the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
5defendant to commit the crime [the defendant had been drinking at the time of the
offense] and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem”).
 Additionally, Mr. Hubbard accepted responsibility for this offense.  He said that
he had no excuse; his intoxication was self-induced, and he felt that this offense would
never have happened if he had been sober.  (Tr., p.866, Ls.3-5.)  He said that he never
intended to hurt anyone, and he was “willing to take full responsibility” for his actions.
(Tr., p.866, L.25 – p.867, L.1.)  He also admitted that he understood how Officer Griffin
must have felt because he could not keep his hands out of his pockets.  (PSI, p.7.)  A
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is also a long-recognized mitigating factor.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing the defendant’s sentence, in
part, because “the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts”).
Finally, Mr. Hubbard has clearly been motivated to make a big change in his life
after the birth of his daughter.  He admitted that, despite remaining sober for two and
one-half years after his rider, he decided to try bath salts and “immediately returned” to
his addictive behaviors.  (PSI, p.27.)  He also admitted that he did not seek treatment
and that the drug took everything from him.  (PSI, p.27.)  However, he said that he was
now very motivated to change because he had a little girl and wanted to “move on into a
sober life” with his daughter.  (PSI, p.27.)  Mr. Hubbard also acknowledged that he did
not “fully engage” in the relationship with the mother of his child but said that he now
wanted her to see that he was serious about recovery and could be a healthy father
figure.  (PSI, p.20.)
6In light of this mitigating information, the district court abused its discretion when
it imposed Mr. Hubbard’s sentence because it did not adequately consider the
information and therefore did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hubbard respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2017.
___________/s/______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I  HEREBY  CERTIFY  that  on  this  5th day of April, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
GREGORY ALLYN HUBBARD
4908 N COLUMBINE
BOISE ID 83713
RICHARD D GREENWOOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KEVIN M ROGERS
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
RPA/eas
